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Games Economists Play
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss*
When Professor Reichman called me about this symposium, I
was intrigued. With the successive introduction of the photocopy
machine, the videotape, computerization, digitization, the Internet,
as well as a host of biotechnological discoveries, the problems facing
the creative industries have changed dramatically. This accumulation of developments has altered the economic foundations on which
intellectual property law is based and has pushed those of us in the
field into a period of reconceptualization in which economic analysis
is particularly fruitful. Thus, I was quite taken with the idea of
bringing intellectual property and economics scholars together to
promulgate a research agenda and I was, of course, delighted to be
asked to contribute my thoughts.
Before I set these out, I would like to begin with a question
that may seem far afield, but which will, I believe, shed light on the
agenda I propose. The question is this: why are there no continental
lawyers here? Given Professor Reichman's prominence in international-particularly European-circles, it should seem quite puzzling. Or rather, it would be quite puzzling to me, but for my experience at the Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International
Patent, Copyright and Competition Law in Munich, Germany. The
Institute does wonderful, insightful work, including excellent empirical studies. But while there, I was struck by the paucity of interest in economic theory among its scholars. As one of my colleagues there explained, continental legal theorists certainly examine economic facts, but they are not of the view that economic
*
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theory has a large role to play in lawmaking. This thinking is, of
course, very much at odds with the core premises of those assembled here, and I would like to take a moment to explore its basis.
One reason for the difference in views on economic analysis
may be specific to intellectual property. The argument here would
be that although Europeans can be as theory-oriented as Americans, continental thinking about intellectual property has traditionally focused on moral arguments-claims about the personality
of the author and his intimate connection to his work.' In contrast,
intellectual property regimes in the United States are constitutionally defined as resting on instrumental-economic-precepts. 2 As a
result, economic analysis arguably has more to contribute here than
it does abroad. But this cannot be the whole answer. It does not, for
example, explain apparent continental indifference to the use of
economic theory with respect to other legal issues, such as tort
questions. Moreover, the rationales underlying intellectual property
regimes are coalescing: as Professor Thomas Dreier has pointed out,
there is more economics in continental rationales for protection
than is usually acknowledged, 3 and the TRIPS Agreement has
brought these systems into even closer alignment. 4 Thus, a mode of
analysis that is utilized in the U.S. should now be relevant to
Europe, even if it lacks intuitive appeal there.
A more general reason for the difference may have something to do with civil versus common law traditions. In civil law
countries, judges are expert fact finders, but as to law, they are said
to do no more than apply what the legislature has set out; there is
no need for economic thinking because there is no room to deviate
from statutory directives. 5 Here, the situation is quite different:

1.
See, e.g., Neil Netanel, Alienability Restrictionsand the Enhancement of Author Auton.
omy in United States and Continental CopyrightLaw, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1994).
2.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (authorizing Congress to enact exclusive rights to promote
progress); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (suggesting that economic incentives are set not to
reward authors, but to serve the constitutional goal).
3.
Thomas Dreier, Balancing Proprietaryand Public Domain Interests: Inside or Outside
of ProprietaryRights, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION
POLICY FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss et al. eds., forthcoming (hereinafter EXPANDING KNOWLEDGE).
4. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C:
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Dec. 15, 1993 [TRIPS
Agreement], 33 ILM 81 (1994), reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS-THE LEGAL TEXTS 6-19, 365-403 (GATT Secretariat ed.,
1994); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
5.
See, e.g., Ottavio Campella, The Italian Legal Profession, 19 J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 60
(1994). Cf. id. at 62-63 (noting that Italian legal education is through lecture, not practice in
applying law to facts).
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common law judges do make law, and they have come to realize
6
that it cannot be done well without input from other disciplines.
But this cannot be the whole of the matter either. Judicial activism
is another thing that is not often acknowledged abroad but exists
anyway. Particularly as new technologies are introduced, continental judges are faced with questions that their legislatures could not
have anticipated. Without an acknowledged law-making tradition
to fall back on, economic thinking should be rather attractive to
them, especially when the need for new law derives from the economic upheavals currently experienced by the information industries. Besides, legal scholars do not confine their influence to courts:
the policymakers and bureaucrats writing new law for the European Union are rather obvious targets for economic analyses.
Of course, the enterprise of creating a union might itself account for some of the difference. In that environment, concerns
about such matters as currency equalization and free movement of
goods may crowd out the kind of economic analysis prevalent in
U.S. circles. But since even the European Union's primary concerns
would benefit from economic elucidation, it remains a mystery why
economic theory has so little traction for Europeans.
My own view is that the explanation lies in another aspect of
the civil versus common law distinction-a difference in the mode of
reasoning which makes the formalism of certain kinds of economic
theory more congenial to common law lawyers than to their civil
counterparts. The kind of analysis I am thinking about starts with
a model or a game: a stylized version of the facts, to which legal
rules are applied, outcomes examined, and policy implications developed. Argument largely centers on whether the application of the
rules to the model actually yields the results suggested, and on how
to structure law to make the best use of the insights the model offers. The assumptions are then "relaxed"-that is, the facts of the
model or game are altered-to see how far the insights of the model
extend. 7 From a formal standpoint, this enterprise actually has a
great deal in common with the sort of appellate advocacy for which
common law legal scholars, judges, and even most legislators, are
trained. A trial court finds the facts; the appellate court tests a va-

6.

See, e.g., MORTON J. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960:

THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-92 (1992); KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1962); JOHN H. SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL

SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); Herbert Hovenkamp, Knowledge About Welfare." Legal Realism and the
Separation of Law and Economics, 4 MINN. L. REV. 805, 854-56 & n.162 (2000).

7. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Multidefendant Settlements: The
Impact of Joint and Several Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 41 (1994).
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riety of legal rules on the facts and chooses the one that best furthers policy. Outcomes are questioned in just the same way as the
outcomes of modeling: were they properly assessed; was the best
way to further policy chosen? And, just as economists relax assumptions to see how far their analyses stretch, so too common lawyers
use a series of fact-altering hypotheticals to determine how far the
chosen legal rule should extend.
Presenting common law lawyers with a model is, in other
words, not too different from presenting them with a case. The
model's teachings are easily incorporated into the common law because acting on the basis of a model feels little different to a common law jurist from being persuaded-or bound-by a prior case.
Civil lawyers are not as accustomed to case-by-case adjudication;
they do not explicitly consider how the outcome of one case affects
another. Reasoning there is more deductive than analogical, and so
it should be no surprise that they would find it hard to incorporate
economic modeling into their lawmaking.8
If this is true-if economic analysis appeals to American
lawyers partly because of its kinship to common law methodologythen there are several implications for law and economics. One is
that the subjects of modeling need to be chosen carefully: if models
have special salience for legal thinkers, then it is important to be
offering models that are geared to the issues lawyers are thinking
about. To put this another way, the field of intellectual property
has, in one sense, been especially blessed by the attention of
economists. But the attention has come from features of intellectual
property law (such as its clear economic basis) that make for "cool"
models; the questions examined are the ones where the mathematics has been worked out or the economic data necessary to use the
model are most readily available.9 These are not, unfortunately,
always the areas where a readily utilizable analysis is especially
needed. Thus, a great deal of work has been done on the economics
of motivating people to engage in risky innovation-to move from
the conception of a difficult problem to the commercialization of an
end product.10.Much less effort has been devoted to the more prosaic

8. I do not mean to say that this is the entire reason that American legal theorists are currently so attracted to economics; for a more comprehensive intellectual history, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 6.
9. Cf. e.g., Zvi Griliches, Productivity,R&D, and the Data Constraint,84 AM. ECON. REV.
1, 14 (1994).
10. See, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Innovation Lottery: The Empirical Case for Copyright and
Patents,in EXPANDING KNOWLEDGE, supranote 3; Henry G. Grabowski & John M Vernon, Pio-
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businesses of marginal (or, as Reichman puts it, small grain11) advances or moving product from lab bench to marketplace-investments that cannot be protected with patents. 12 Emerging industries
attract attention; 13 the needs of maturing industries-indeed the
question whether mature industries have different legal needs from
emerging ones-have been largely ignored. 14 Phenomena that gen15
erate data, like collective rights organizations, are amply studied;
amorphous doctrines, such as fair use, which have enormous legal
significance but little by way of hard facts, do not receive as much
attention from pure economists. 16 Revising the criteria for choosing
projects to make the need for attention a paramount consideration
would go a long way to putting economists' input to better use
within the legal community.17
There is a second, and to my mind, more important implication of seeing common law jurisprudence as particularly susceptible
to economic analysis. It lies in making sure that the common features of the formalism in common law and in economics do not obneers, Imitators, and Generics-A Simulation Model of Schumpeterian Competition, 102 Q. J.
ECON. 491 (1987).
11. See Jerome Reichman, Of Green Tulips Legal Kudzu Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Ignatius Horstmann et al., Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To
Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent, 93 J. POL. ECON. 837 (1985) (noting that, generally, non-patent
oriented behavior is not studied enough); Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents,Prizes, and Research Contracts,73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1983).
13. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent
Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 884-97 (1990) (discussing the effect of broad-scoped pioneer patents on subsequent innovations in various industries); Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for FunctionalExpression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1151 n.4 (1998) (surveying the extensive literature on
the copyrightability of computer programs).
14. See generally Steven Klepper, Entry, Exit, Growth, and Innovation over the Product Life
Cycle, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 562 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA.
L. REV. 383 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
16. For example, a search on "fair use" in the economics journals in the JSTOR database
(which is, admittedly, limited and time bound) provides 19 hits-many fewer than virtually any
issue in patent law. This is not to say that there is a lack of economic analysis in the legal literature. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1661 (1988); Wendy Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1602-05 (1982).
17. Of course, there is another problem with economic analysis: it misses the implications
of nonmonetizable values. This is a problem that Laurence Tribe identified in environmental
law literature. See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About PlasticTrees: New Foundations
for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974). The issue, however, is for lawyers using economic analysis, not for economists themselves. Cf. James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87 (1997) (arguing for a movement among
user groups for effective regulation of the information "environmene' akin to the movement that
produced environmental protection legislation). See also Fisher, supranote 16, at 1697-98.
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scure a crucial distinction between the two. Common law's analogic
reasoning looks at how particular rules play on specified facts; it is
not terribly relevant whether the facts leading up to the rule
matched the historical truth about the case where the rule was articulated. This is not so when law is derived from models-there,
underlying facts matter. Consider Case X, in which an appellate
court articulated Rule 1. A court considering whether to apply Rule
1 to the facts of Case Y may review the facts of Case Y (probably on
a deferential basis 8 ). However, the wisdom of applying Rule 1 to
the case is entirely independent of whether the facts of Case X were
rightly determined. The court asks, given how Rule 1 was used under the facts as we have them in X, how should Y come out?
In contrast, the insights of a model are entirely contingent
on what underlies it. Whether Rule 2, derived from an economic
model, should be applied to Case Y depends on what underlies the
model-whether it captures the critical elements of the issue common to X and Y, and whether its assumptions are valid. Thus, the
court should not treat the decision to apply Rule 2 in exactly the
same way as it treats the decision to apply Rule 1: it needs to examine the factual basis of Rule 2 in a way it does not need to examine the facts underlying Rule 1. To the extent the commonality
of the formalism obscures that point to lawyers using models, the
economists who develop the models must take up the slack. They
must be the ones to examine the moders underlying facts and assumptions before they promulgate them as solutions to legal problems.
There are many examples of issues that could use further
development along these lines. But where I would most like to see
more scholarship focus is in work on bargaining. As it happens,
there are many issues arising in intellectual property law-the
need for compulsory licensing, the scope of patent claims, the standard of inventiveness-that would benefit from an understanding of
when transactions are likely to occur. In a sense, there are now two
camps: transactional optimists, exemplified by the likes of Professors Rob Merges and Suzanne Scotchmer, 19 who believe that with
strong, clear rights, bargaining will generally occur, and transac-

18. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 52-53.
19. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
CoLuM. L. REV. 2655, 2675-58 (1994); Suzanne Scotchmer, ProtectingEarly Innovators: Should
Second-Generation ProductsBe Patentable?, 27 RAND J. ECON. 322 (1996); Suzanne Scotchmer,
Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 29 (1991).
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tional pessimists, such as Professors Rebecca Eisenberg and Pamela Samuelson, who think law should be shaped by the concern that
agreements will not always take place easily. 20 Right now, the state
of play is that the optimists are winning. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions
Act are just two examples of laws structured on the optimistic view:
they provide very little by way of public interest safeguards on the
theory that access interests can be taken care of through bargaining. 21 Yet there has been very little examination of the assumptions
underlying the pro-transaction model.
What I believe has happened is that economists have done
an excellent job analyzing prisoners' dilemmas-situations involving information asymmetries, where the models (correctly) predict
that it will be difficult for participants to coordinate their efforts for
mutual benefit. The success here has, however, led to a certain
complacency about dealing with the converse situation, where information is symmetrically disposed. But the fact that informational asymmetry leads to transactional difficulty does not imply
that transactions will always be easy so long as information is
equally available to all participants.
In fact, many intellectual property situations involve such
dealings-transactions between the owners of complementary patent assets, such as a pioneer patentee and the holder of a patent on
an improvement; the patentee of a partial genomic sequence and
the party with a patent on the other part, or on an effective delivery
vector; the firm with a pharmaceutical patent and the holder of the
orphan drug right on the same compound. Each situation involves,
essentially, a bilateral monopoly. Because patents disclose, both
sides have similar information about the inventions and their potential uses; there is no (or very little) private information. Most
importantly, there are clear gains from trade. That is, both sides
know there is value in putting their rights together to create a single monopoly, and both sides know that if they fail, the value is
(near) zero. In these situations, transactional optimists (most of

20. See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can PatentsDeter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 ScI. 698 (May 1, 1998); Pamela Samuelson & Robert
J. Glushko, Intellectual PropertyRights for Digital Library and Hypertext PublishingSystems, 6
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237 (1993).
21. Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (adding 17
U.S.C. §§ 1201-05); Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act ('UCITA"), available at
http:/www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc_frame.htm. See generally, Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking
Barriers:The Relation Between Contractand Intellectual PropertyLaw, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
827 (1998).
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whom are economists) predict a bargain will be struck; yet (as the
lawyers who largely make up the pessimist camp know), we do not
always observe these trades occurring. 22 Often there is no agreement at all, or the agreement is much delayed. In the case of patents, it is sometimes so far into the patent term that significant
value is dissipated.
There are several reasons why lawyers' and industries' actual experiences might differ so sharply from what economic analysis would predict. Clearly, one problem is valuation. Prisoners' dilemmas are not very sensitive to the values each player attaches to
outcomes. Over a broad range of values, these models will correctly
predict when there will be a problem coordinating behavior (indeed,
the uncertainty over value probably increases the likelihood of a
problem). But as Eisenberg's work tends to show, it may be that in
"nondilemmas"-that is, when outcomes *(the inventions produced
by experimentation) are known, valuation problems matter a great
deal. 23 Current models may not be accounting for this level of sensitivity to accuracy.
Outlook is another factor that might make a difference.
Transactional optimists tend to base their views on experiences
with tangibles, such as water and cattle. 24 The participants in these
arrangements share expectations and enjoy a common understanding of background rules. These factors may make it easier for
them to reach agreement than it is for actors in the innovation industries, who will often come from different disciplines and not be
25
situated in geographic proximity.
And then there is the issue of repeat play: models that count
situations (the kind that produce standard contracts,
repetitive
on
tailored solutions, and an etiquette for bargaining) may not be apt
for analyzing innovation, where there are many one-off deals and
where it may not make financial sense to invest effort in predicting
what could happen or in negotiating over every contingency.

22. Cf. Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Rewards versus IntellectualPropertyRights
(proposing a system of federal payment for patentable inventions as a way to avoid transaction
problems of the type described in text), availableat http://papers.ssrn.compaper.taf?ABSTRACT
ID=145292.
23. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 20.
24. Frequently cited are works such as ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1 (1990) (water rights) and Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle:Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 623 (1986) (land and cattle).
25. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, CollaborativeResearch. Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1161 (2000).

20001

GAMES ECONOMISTS PLAY

1829

In any event, my point here is not to criticize particular
models and certainly not to offer instructions on how to conduct
economics research (it is not my field, and likely there are many
features that I have not discussed that will turn out to matter). Nor
do I think there is a real choice between transactional pessimism
and optimism. Rather, I want to suggest that if greater attention is
paid to bargaining in the presence of information symmetry, it
should be possible to figure out when optimism is justified and
when it is not, and to find ways to facilitate transactions when circumstances warrant the adoption of a pessimistic attitude. Such an
understanding would be a big help to those in the legal community
who have taken on the task of fashioning rules that promote the
optimum usage of intellectual production.
CONCLUSION
Many of the advances posing great challenge to intellectual
property theory result from the confluence of developments within
previously separate disciplines-biology and chemistry, computer
science and business. Meeting these challenges will likewise require
cross-disciplinary interchange. This symposium is, hopefully, the
beginning of that process for intellectual property lawyers and
economists interested in innovation.

